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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
CACHE VALLEY BANKING COM-
pANY, a Utah corporation, as Ex-
ecutor of the Last Will and Testa-
ment of WILFORD F. BATTGH, 
Deceased, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
C A C H E C 0 U N T Y POULTRY 
GROWER'S ASSOCIATION, a 
corporation, and UTAH POULTRY 
& FARMERS COOPERATIVE, ·a 
corporation, 
Defendants and Resp·on,dents. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
Case No. 
7304 
APPEAL FROM THE DisTRICT CouRT oF THE FmsT JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF UTAH, IN AND 
FOT THE CouNTY oF CACHE 
RoN. MARRINER M. MoRRISON, Judge 
F I L E UrN CLAWSON 
r. ~~ f) ~·~. Q Attorney for Defendant and 
. ~ · ~ · • .. J ... t .,· t. Respondent, Utah Poultry & 
_ Jla,rm,ers Cooperative. 
·-OL£i-K,·iuPR£i"E.counr. uTAH 
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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
C~-\CHE \T_A.LijEY B ... -\Xl'-ING COnJ-
p ...:-\.XY, a T'tah eorporation, a~ Ex-
ecutor of the Last \·rill and Testa-
Inent of \·rrr~FORD F. BAlTGH, 
Deceased, 
Plain.tifl and _.:l]Jpellanf, 
YS. 
C ... -\ C H E C 0 lT N T Y POULTRY 
GROWER'S ASSOCIATION, a 
corporation, and UTAH POULTRY 
& F ... -\R~IER~ COOPERATIVE, a 
corporation, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 
7~04 
In general, respondent agrees with appellant's state-
ment of facts but disputes some of the assertions. It is 
felt that the follo,ving facts are supported by the evi-
dence: 
On page 4 of appellant's brief it is stated: "There 
. were no marks on the premises to indicate a traveled 
0 d 
" 
r a ... 
It was hard surfaced (Tr. 142, 148). It had the 
appearance of a road (Tr. 134 bottom, 147 bottom) and 
showed signs of wear where vehicles passed down the 
roadway (Tr. 141 hottom, 192 bottom, 193, 194). Noth-
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ing grew in the roadway (Tr. 134 middle). It was 
described as a ''very good road'' ( Tr. 14 7 bottom). Its 
width was sufficient for two trucks· to pass (Tr. 158 
bottom, 159). Trucks have a maximum width of 8 feet 
(Tr. 159). The roadway passed between the scalehouse 
on the north and the railroad spur track on the south 
( Tr. 159 top) and the scalehouse was measured to be 17 
feet north of the north side of respondent's property. 
The south edge of the disputed right of ~ay was just 
north of the respondent's north line (Tr. 194 middle, 200 
middle, 201). So much for the question of the evidence 
of a road. 
As to the amount of traffic on the disputed right of 
way, in and out of the Cache Valley Commission Com-
pany's property, the undisputed testimony was that it 
"was in constant use'' (Tr. 107 middle); "It was in 
heavy use" (Tr. 111 bottom); "It was used every day" 
(Tr. 112). It appeared " ... almost like the traffic on 
l\1:ain Street" (Tr. 112 top). " ... practically everyone 
... who patronized the Cache Commission Co., and 
that was nearly everybody" used the disputed right of 
way (Tr. 148 middle). "I would say fifty to a hundred 
people'' and vehicles used the disputed right of way 
every day (Tr. 149 middle). See also more testimony to 
the same effect in the Transcript, page 155 (middle), 
page 169 (top), page 171 (middle), page 175 (bottom), 
and page 185 (bottom). Carloads of produce were 
shipped out (Tr. 215, 219, 220). Carloads of supplies 
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brought in and the outgoing produce \Ya~ brought into 
the \Yarehouse, and the incoming supplie~ \Yere sold to 
customers \Yho can1e and '"~nt over the rlispnted right 
of \Yay. 
One more faet \Yhirh enters into the consideration 
here is that the Utah Idaho c~ntral Railroad, whose 
Logan freight yard \Yas finally sold to the plaintiff's 
testate on Rec.eiYer 's sale (page 014-016, all references 
to page numbers in this paragraph are to the abstract 
of title, Exhibit E)' and over the south rod of vvhich the 
disputed right of "~ay ran, was a weak, sick railroad from 
its inception. It was first mortgaged in 1915 (page 004), 
and again in 1920, (page 006) and sold by Receiver's 
Deed in 1926 (page 007). It was mortgaged again in 
1926 (page 010) and sold again by a receiver in 1939 
(page 011). It was mortgaged still again in 1939, this 
time with both a first and a second mortgage· (pages 012, 
013). The railroad was finally abandoned and its pro-
perty sold in small parcels by a receiver in the United 
Rtates District Court in 1947 (pages 014 and 018). 
It is said at the bottom of page 5 of the brief that 
customers had access to Second South at any time. That 
alley was not opened to traffic at first (Tr. 218); later 
it was, but was not used very much. 
While Mr. Bowen said he didn't intend to acquire 
a prescriptive easement ( Tr. 221), no evidence was. in-
troduced of the Cache Valley Commission Comp·any's 
intention in that regard. This company was a corpora-
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tion (Tr. 212 middle). G. B. Bowen was its manager 
(Tr. 212). 
It is stated on page 12 of the brief that there is no 
evidence that the disputed right of way was used for 
foot or animal traffic. It was testified that the employees 
of the respondent's predecessor used the disputed right 
of way for ingress and egress ( Tr. 186 middle). No pre-
sumption is known that such employees would be riding 
rather than walking. And it was used by vehicles (Tr. 
110 middle, 186 middle) and by teams (Tr. 110 middle). 
It was stipulated that not only the seven witnesses 
who testified as to the use of the disputed right of way 
C on Exhibit 3, by the large number of customers of 
the Cache Valley Commission (predecessor in interest 
of the respondent) in going to and from that company's 
place of business, the condition of the· roadway and the 
position of it, but that nine other witnesses would testify 
to the same things the seven had sworn to (Tr. 190, 191, 
192). 
ARGUMENT 
Appellant bank's first point relates to the shifting 
of the burden of proof and in support of the claim that 
the burden did not shift from respondent to appellant, 
states that there is no evidence that the use of the dis-
puted right of way was adverse or under claim of right 
or that ap-pellant knew of such facts. (Both the appel-
lant and the respondent are successors in interest to the 
parties who were the owners at the time the acts referred 
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to~ \Yere done. \\~hil~ thP rP fprenep to n ppP llan t o 1't Pll 
tilnes actually is to appellant~s prerlPce~~or, that fnet 
is ignored \\~here not iinportant to thP i~snes of t hP en~P.) 
X(YI'()RIOlTS "(TSI~: OF, RIG ll T OF \\' r\-Y 
Let ns disen~~ the last point first that there i~ no 
. 
pvidence that the appellant kne'v of the n~e of thiR di~-
puted right of \Yay in obtaining ingres~ and egress to 
the Cache ,..,. alley Conunission propert~T· It see1ns in-
credible that the railroad could not haYe known of its 
n;e hy the Cache , ... alle~T Con1mission e1nployees and 
rnsto1ners. ~-\_s noted in the Facts at the beginning of this 
brief, that traffic to and from the Con1mission 's property 
over the disputed right of "\Va~~ 'vas such that the road 
'vas in "constant use" (Tr. 107), "heavy use ... every 
day" (Tr. 111). "It appeared ... almost like the traffic 
on Main Street'' ( Tr. 112). 
''Actual notice to the owner of the servient 
estate is not necessary if the user is so notorious 
that in the exercise of reasonable diligence, the 
o"\vner should learn thereof; then he will have 
constructive notice of the user which is sufficient. 
Dahl v. Roach, 76 Utah 7 4, 287 P. 622; Bolton v. 
Murphy, 41 Utah 591, 127 P. 355; Crosier v. 
Brown, 66 \V. Va. 273, 66 S. E. 326, 25. L. R. A. 
(N. S.) 174; Gardner v. Swann, 114 Ga. 304, 40 
S. E. 271; Schulenbarger v. Johnstone, 64 Wash. 
202, 116 P. 843, 35 L. R. A. (N. S.) 941; Wats~on 
v. Board of County C~ommissioners, 38 Wash. 662, 
80 P. 201 ; 2 Tiffany on Real Property ( 2d Ed.), 
521.'' 
.Trnsen v. Gerrard, R5 Utah 481, 39 P(2) 1070, 2. It 
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would appear from the heavy, constant use that the 
doctrine of the Jensen case applies here. It can't be 
claimed that appellant did not know of our use of the 
disputed right of way. 
This brings us to the main point in this case, namely: . 
OPEN USER FOR ·THE PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD 
RAISES A PRESUMPTION OF ADVERSE CLAIM. 
This court, in the case of Zollinger v. Frank, 110 
Utah 514, 175 P.(2) 714, quoted with approval the follow-
ing from 17 Am. Jur. 981, Sec. 72: 
''The prevailing rule is that where a claim-
ant has shown an open, visible, continuous, and 
unmolested use of land for the period of time 
sufficient to acquire an easement by adverse user, 
the use will be presumed to be under a claim of 
right. The owner of the servient estate, in order 
to avoid the acquisition of an ·easement by pre-
scription, has the burden of rebutting this pre-
sumption by showing that the use was permis-
sive." 
In 1 Thompson on Real Property (Perm. Ed.) 718, 
Sec. 436, the matter is treated thus: 
''The uninterrupted, continued and unex-
plained, or undisputed use uf an alleged e'asement 
for the established period of prescription raises 
a 'presumption that the use was under elaim of 
right ·of grant, and the burden is then .on the 
.o,vner of the servient e.sta te to show that .the use 
has been permissive ·or by virtue of a license.'' 
And the same author, in 2· Thompson R:eal Property 
(.Perm. Ed.) 114. Sec. 525, further dis-cusses the matt~r 
in this way: 
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~·In an aetiun to f\~tablish a right of \Yay· h~· 
prP~eription, the que~tion i8 for thP jury \VhPthPr 
the u~e '"a~ under a rlain1 of right, or \VHH nlPl'Pl~· 
a n1atter of neighborly neeonunodation. The bur-
den of proof is on the lando\vnPr to 8hO\\' that the 
n~~ of a "~ay oYer hi8 land, for the prP8rriptiYP 
period, '"a~ b~y licPnse and not adYP1'8P. If one 
n~e~ ·a road oYer the land of another, \vithout 
asking leave and 'vithout objection, a grant is 
presumed: hut this prf\sumption may be rebutted 
in sub~erYienre to the title of the O\Yner. 'In the 
absence of evidence tending t·o sho\v that such 
long <¥lntinued use of the vvay may he referred to 
a license~ or special indulgence, that is either re-
vocable or tern1inable, the conclusion is that it 
ha~ gro\vn ·Out of a grant by the owner of the land 
and ha~ been exrcised under a title thus de-
rived.' '' 
In 28 C.J.~. 736, the ~uhject is treated thus: 
''While the contrary is true in some jurisdic-
tions, sometimes by reason of statute, the general 
rule is that proof of an open, notorious, continu-
ous and uninterrupted user for the p-rescriptive 
period, without evidence to explain how it began, 
raises a presumption that it was ·adverse and un-
der a claim of right, or, as is sometimes stated, 
raises a presumpti·on of a grant, and casts on the 
owner of the servient tenement the burden ·of 
showing that the user was permissive or by vir-
tue of some license, indulgence, ·or agreement, in-
consistent with the right cl·aimed." 
This prevailing rule is the law in the State of Utah 
and is con trolling in this case. This court, in Zollinger 
Y. Frank, 110 Utah ;)14, 175 P.(2) 714, after quoting the 
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American Juris prudence statement set forth above, said: 
''We think the better rule is that described 
as the prevailing rule in the above quotation. 
That is, where a claimant has shown an open and 
eontinuous use of the land for the prescriptive 
period ( 20 years in Utah) the use will be pre-
sumed to have been against the owner and the 
owner of the servient estate to prevent the ~re­
scriptive easement from arising has the burden 
of showing that the use was under him instead 
of against him. This rule was mentioned in the 
recent case of Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Co. 
v. Moyle, Utah, 159 P. 2d 596, (j>n rehearing) 
174 P. 2d 148, 155, where it was s1aid: 'It is true 
that t·o establish an easement the use must be 
notorious and continuous and on this adverseness 
-that is, holding against the ·owner-will be pre-
sumed.' See also Northwest Cities Gas Co. v. 
Western Fuel Co., 13 Wash. 2d 75, 123 P. 2d 771; 
Eagle Rock Corporation v. Idamont Hotel Co., 
59 Idaho 413, 85 P. 2d 242; Fleming v. Howard, 
150 Cal. 28, 87 P. 908 ; Stetson v. Youngquist, 
76 M·ont. 600, 248 P. 196. 
''In this case Zollinger shows and the court 
found an open and continuous use for the pre-
scriptive period. The presumption that the use 
was against the landowner therefore arises.'' 
On page 14 of its Brief, the bank seeks to escape 
the effect of the Zollinger case by reference to Harkness 
v. Woodmansee, 7 Utah 227, 26 P. 291. In that case, 
the decision was directed to the question of whether the 
statutory period for adverse possession applied or the 
longer 20 year prescriptive rule. After much discussion, 
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the 20 y~nr rule \VH~ applied. Then follo"·~ thi~ ~tntP­
Inent on page ~~)3 ( 2t1 P. :2~);~) : 
"It is eo needed that the usP and enjoy1nen t, 
such as it 'vas, 'vas for lPss than :.?0 years, so that 
period of limitation cannot apply." 
Thi~ di~posed of that easP. Ineidentally and hy \Vn~· 
of dicta, the eourt made the state1nent quoted on page 
14 of the appellant's brief. But it \Ya~ Inade 'vith refer-
ence to a clain1 of a 10 .foot right of \Yay 'vhich 'vas per-
Inanently occupied by a platform 'vhirh jutted out 3 or 
4 feet into the passage,Ya)~ and the balance of the pro-
posrd right of \Yay ".,.a.s customarily filled by a team that 
\vas kept tied to the platform. 
Reference is also made to the case of Jensen v. 
Gerrard,. 85 Utah 481, 39 P.(2) 1070, which is likewise 
unavailing as an authority for the case at bar. In that 
ease, the alleged servient estate owner brought the suit 
to restrain the defendant from using the ~roadway. It 
·appeared that plaintiff's predecessor had required and 
received rent repeatedly for the use of the roadway in 
question and that such payments had been made within 
the 20 year period. (The case was decided by the 'S·u-
preme Court in 1935, and the last cash payment ~as made 
in 1916 and permission was sought and obtained for the 
use of the road in the next year, 1917). Applying the 
rule established in the Zollinger case, this use was 
''under'' and not ''against'' the owner of the servient 
estate and hence could not be the basis for a prescrip~ 
tive right. 
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I_Jet us here pause a Inoment to note that in the 
case at bar, there was no permission ever sought or ob-
tained (Tr. 117, 13'6, 149, 166 and 168). No one ever ob-
jected to their use. of the road (Tr. 136). No barriers 
were ever erected (Tr. 136, 149, 166). The appellant 
bank produced the manager of the Cache Valley Com-
. mission Company who was such from the time that cor-
poration began its occupancy of the warehouse until it 
"\\7as taken over by the respondent association. He was 
in a position to state whether there was any writing 
granting permission to his company. He could also 
have testified to any parol agreement for the use of the 
property. He did not do so. We can only surmise that 
the use was without any permission. 
The respondent next refers to the case of Bertolina 
v. Frates, 89 Utah 238, 57 P.(2) 346, wherein a para:-
graph is quoted with reference to the effect of the use 
by others of the right of way and its effect upon those 
claiming a right growing out of such use. We have no 
quarrel with the doctrine that the use by third persons 
of a right of way cannot, generally speaking, inure to 
the use of the dominent estate tenant. But that rule is 
subject to limitations which the Bertolina case did not 
go into because they were not. involved in the facts of 
that case. 
10 
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RinHT t)F O\Y.Xl1~H. t)J:1_, 1)()~11Nb~Nrfl l1~~rr_i\rl'bJ 
TO lL:\ \~r~ 'rHE \Y .. -\ \T .. -\ \'" .:\IL.:\BI~E FOB 
l~SE BY 'l,HIR.D P:b} B~( )N~ 
\\~hile it is trnP~ n~ pointed out in the l~Prtolina en~P, 
that the O\YJH?r of the don1inent P~tatP eannot gain a 
right of \Yay by ~ho\Ying that third person~ had snrh a 
right, there are cnst:•s \Yhere the use n1ade hy third per-
sons does i_nure to the benefit of the O\Yner of thP d<nnin-
ent estate. The subject is headnoterl in 28 C.J.~. ~ee. 
90, page 769, thusly: 
''\\"'"hile a private \vay may not be used by the 
general public, it may be used by the owner of the 
\vay, his family, tenants, servants, and guests, as 
well as by persons transacting business with him, 
in the ahsence: of a special agreement to the con-
trary.'' 
And the same authority follows up this headnote 
with this language: ~, · .(:;: 
"vVhile a private 'vay may not be used by the 
public generally or b~~ any one having no better 
right than the general public, the owner of such 
a way i~ not limited to its use hy himself, but it 
may be used by his family, by tenants occupying 
the land \vith his authority, by his servants, 
agents, or employees in conducting his business, 
by persons transacting business with him, or by 
guests for social purposes, except in cases where 
the right of way is created by express agreement 
and the user is restricted by the terms of the 
agreement.'' 
A rather recent case involving this extent of user 
i~ that of Unverzagt v. ~.filler, 306 Mich. 260, 10 NW(2) 
11 
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849, where the defendant owned the fee of the streetf' 
of a resort, subject to an easement for use by cottage 
owners. The defendant sought to collect a license fee 
from trades people attempting to deliver purchased arti-
cles to cottage owners. It was held that she eould not 
do so. 
851. ''This is not a question of the right 
of outside merchants and tradesmen to use pri-
vate streets; rather we consider it a question of 
the right of the cottage owners to have the streets 
used by those who are invited and requested by 
cottage owners to make use of the streets for 
plaintiff's benefit. Such merchants and trades-
Inen should be considered as invitees of the cot-
tage owners ; and under the circumstances of this 
case, we consider such use reasonably necessary 
for the use and enjoyment of the easement. 
"This does not mean that any and all in-
vitees of a cottage owner may have the right to 
use the streets. To so hold would mean that a 
cottage owner might invite the use of the streets 
by conventions, picnics, assemblies in general . . . 
As thus limited, the use of the street by merchants 
and tradesmen will not constitute an unlawful 
increase of the burden on the servient estate.'' 
The rule was approved by the New Jersey court in 
Shreve v. Mathis, 63 N.J.E. 170, 52 Atl. 234, where the 
owner of the dominent estate operated a milk station 
and used an alley for entrance and exit. The owner of 
the alley attempted to bar Plaintiff's use except by foot. 
The court held he could not do so, saying (62 Atl. 238): 
''The way helongs to him as his property. 
12 
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... -\11 person~ haYing occasion 111ny \vith his ( o':ner 
of don1inent estate) pern1ission ·transact business 
\vith him by passing to and fro over the vvay. '' 
. The rule has application to all easements, not just 
those created by grant. In Comn1onweath v. Buford, 
2:2:-l Pa. 93, 73 _._~tl. 1064, the Pennsylvania court applied 
the rule to a \vay of necessity. In that case the owners 
of some coke ovens erected houses vvhich they rented to 
"rorkmen. They also ovvned the fee to the streets and 
did not dedicate them to the public. The Defendant in 
this case vvas a tradesman who was arrested for trespass 
\Vhile delivering over these private ways foods which had 
been ordered. It \Vas held that he was not a trespasser 
because a way of necessity would he acknowledged, and 
\ 
such way included the right to use the streets by the 
renter and his 'family 
'' : .. and others who with permission of the 
tenant visit his home for any lawful purpose." 
It is a matter of the type of easement claimed. A 
right of way for passage by vehicle would not su~tain 
the privileges to put an.irrigation ditch upon the same 
property and convey water in it. And so in the case at 
bar, it is not a matter of the hundreds of customers gain-
ing a right of way or we gaining their privileges. Rathe;r 
it is the type of easement claimed, which here is to have 
a right of ingress and egress over the disputed right 
of vvay for the officers and servants and customers of the 
owner of the dominent esta.te. 
13 
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WIDTH OF THE RIGHT OF WAY 
On page 17 of the brief, the bank questions the width 
of the right of way found by the court. As noted supra 
under the heading of Facts, the undisputed evidence was 
that the way was wide enough for two trucks to pass 
. ( Tr. 158 and 159 bottom). These trucks had a maximu1n 
\vidth of 8 feet (Tr. 159). The roadway was south of the 
scalehouse (Tr. 159 top) which was 17 feet north of the 
south line of the appellant's property (Tr. 195 top). The 
south edge of the disputed right of way was just north 
of appellant's south and our north line (Tr. 194 middle, 
200 middle, 201). And it will be remembered that the 
road was graveled ( Tr. 116, 133 171, 200, and 201), had a 
I 
solid bed to it (Tr. 171), and was hard surfaced (Tr. 142, 
148). There was no evidence that the north 4 feet of our 
property (that lying between the spur and appellant's 
south property line) had any of those characteristics. 
On page 18 of appellant's brief, an attempt is made 
to distinguish this case from the Zollinger one on the 
ground that in the latter the right of way was fenced. 
While there is no particular magic in a fence, so far as 
that case was concerned, in the case at bar there was an 
effective barricade between the appellant bank's pro-
perty and that of respondent, one which would have made 
the use of the disputed right of way difficult if the rail-
road had left it that way. I refer to the spur track where 
the rails projected above the surface of the ground. But 
14 
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the railroad proYided n ero~~ing ovPr thi~ barrier h)' 
placing planks so as to render it ea~ily passable. 
OBI.AIGJ.~TIOX TO KEEP TRESPASSERS OUT 
~-\t the top of· page 19 of appellant's brief and at 
nunterous other plaef\s, appellant sets a "man of straw" 
hy ~aying that if a prescriptiYe right is thus gained, it 
\Vould require a public serYice corporation to hire police-
Inen to keep trespassers off the property and WOUld re-
quire a util!ty to '·ride herd'' on all persons coming into 
their freight yards. If appellant was right, it would 
require similar action by every shopkeeper to eliminate 
all but those '\vho are determined to buy in ·his store. 
But there is no such requirement. 
However, '\vhen the customers and officers and em-
ployees of an adjoining land owner flow over the land 
of another to the extent of 50 to 100 per day (Tr. 149), 
until at times the traffic resembled that on Main Street 
(Tr. 112), and practically everyone in Logan came and 
went to the Cache Valley Commission Company pro-
perty over this right of way (Tr. 148), and that flow of 
traffic was not secretive or unseen but consisted of 
farmers' teams and wagons and trucks and cars, then 
the owners whose land is being thus used cannot sit 
by for twenty-five years and claim that he was required 
by the nature of his business to permit it and that no 
prescriptive right had been gained. One just can't sit 
by and see that stream of traffic flo\ving to and from the 
street and the point of crossing of the spur and let it go 
15 
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on for more than· twenty-five years and then attempt to 
block up that roadway or crossing. 
'The court and counsel will recall that in some places 
in .L.os Angeles, the sidewalks are as broad ~s those in 
Salt Lake, while in others they are narrow and terribly 
congested. It will also be recalled that where the build-
ings are set back to give that broad way there is a brass 
band which runs down inside line of the old sidewalk, 
and in the space between the band and the buildings ap-
pears a plate imbedded in the concrete which notifies all 
that the property inside the brass band is private pro-
peTty and the license to use that private property iH 
revocable at any time. 
Frequently we see signs over or at the side of alley-
ways that the property is private, and the owner can 
forbid the use of the way to any or all. This was not 
done.· 
This public utility had retained attorneys who were 
leading members of the bar. Those attorneys and the 
officers and servants ·of this railroad knew the dangen~ 
which result from the long continued use of a right of 
way much better than the board of directors of the Cache 
Valley Commission Company. The officers and em-
pibyees of that public· utility knew about rights of way. 
Their ro'ad bed and spurs were constructed on property, 
niucb. of which was held only under an easement. They 
' ' 
were' dealing in· easements constantly. They handled 
hundreds of rights of way. .They knew of this danger to 
16 
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their property, thi~ pre~rriptiYP right of \Vay, \Vhich 
'vas building up. They took no stt>ps to prevent it either 
~hort of the t'v~n ty years or in thP y~ars \Vhich followed 
or eYer or at all. It is only \\~hen a local buyer, ae-
qua.inted \vith this long continued use, purchased the 
land and his heirs desire to g·et more than their donor 
paid for that \Ye have thi~ road\vay blork0d for the first 
ti1ne in about thirty years. 
Ho,veYer, before leaving this plPa about being re-
quired to keep the freight yard open and hence unable 
to keep out these 50 to 100 teams a day from the Cache 
\ .... alley Commission Company, let us point out that this 
fancied obligation_ of the carrier to the public could not 
possibly include opening private entrances into the 
freight yard, nor the placing of heavy planking to enable 
all this traffic to flow in and out of the disputed high-
way adjacent to the spur. And the railroad, without 
·hiring policemen or closing their freight yard to the pub-
lic, could have choked off this growing right by the 
simple expedient of putting up a fence along their p.ro-
perty line between the main building and the warehouse. 
But instead, it installed heavy plank crossings to facili-
tate the use of its road. 
On page 20 of the appellant's brief, it is urged that 
it would be incompatible with its duty to serve the 
public, if the interurban had not permitted the public 
free access. But no cases are cited to show that railroad 
1nust open its property to the public so they may come 
17 
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on it at any place. Railroads have the same rights as 
others, to fence their property and keep the public off 
of it and to set up entrances where the public can be 
served and to require the public to enter at those en-
trances if they seek its services. 
In the middle of page 20 of its brief, appellant says 
that if this right of way is granted, it will a1nount to tak-
ing property without due process. It is sufficient answer 
to that to say that if imposing this burden is taking 
the property without due process, the same objection 
could be raised to all prescriptive easements. In view 
of the fact that no citations are offered or argument 
made, it may be safe to assert that this claim was thrown 
in for rhetorical effect only. 
Before leaving this portion of the case, it might be 
well to exan1ine an assumption that the 50 to 100 vehiclrs 
that passed over the disputed right of way in going to 
and :from the Cache Valley property could not be dis-
·. tinguished from the heavy traffic flowing in and out of 
. this railroad freight yard. As pointed out under the 
. heading of "Facts," this railroad was no great artery 
of .commerce. It was a poor,. sick, little interurban, pass-
ing from mortgage to mortgage and from receiver to 
~receiver and from sale to sale. Three times in its brief 
·.span of thirty years (which exactly paralleled the use 
of right of way here) it completed the cycle of mortgage, 
receivership and sale. The last time, the owne·rs wer·e 
apparently convinced that the traffic wasn't there to 
18 
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~ustain the business and the ~ale \Vas not of the railroad 
in its entirety but by parcels. If the business was that 
bad, and, if the business furnished the interurban by the 
o\vner of the serYient estate w·as as great as the testimony 
show·s (38 ears of apples one time, Tr. 215; other cars of 
apples, Tr. 220: other cars of seed, Tr. 215; and was con-
sidered one of the interurban's "good eustomers ". (Tr. 
216), it would appear that this 50 to 100 vehicles a day 
passing over the dispu!ed right of \vay to and from the 
Cache \'alley Commission Company (Tr. 149), this traf-
fic like that on Main Street (Tr. 112), must have been con-
spicuous in th solitude of the freight yard. 
NO WAY OF NECESSITY CLAIMED 
On page 21 and elsewhere it is hinted that we are 
grounding our right of way on the necessity of ·such a 
road. This is not our contention. We have a passage 
along the north side of our prop:erty where the spur was, 
and we seek to use that space for the same purpose for 
\Vhich the spur area was used, namely, to load and unload 
large shipments through the north doorways. Since the 
disputed right of· way has been blocked off, our traffic 
has used that portion of our land formerly occupied by 
the spur, as a passageway in lieu of the right of way 
used for the preceding 30 years. And when big semi-
trailers are being loaded and unloaded at the north. doors, 
it is necessary to divert the traffic from even this tem-
porary passageway. But we claim no way of necessitv. 
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We claim a right of way which accrued during 30 years 
o'f open, continuous, notorious use which was taken with-
out seeking or obtaining the permission of the inter-
urban. 
The case of Savage v. Nielsen, ____ Utah --------, 197 
P.(2) 117, is cited to the effect that all.use of a right of 
way is not adverse. But the facts there distinguish that 
case from the one at bar. The predecessor of the owner 
of the dominent' estate testified that he used the road by 
permission ( 197 P. (2) 123) and he so continued until 
1936. But in our case neither the previous owner of the 
dominent estate nor its manager testified that permis-
.. 
sion was ever sought or granted to use the disputed 
right .of way. 
On page 23, ·this thought of permission is ·dwelt on 
further, and it is stated that the companies were working 
together in a friendly fashion. Butis a permit to use the 
roadway, as· distinguished from use without. a peTmit, 
thus leading to a prescriptive right, the only deduction 
which ean be made of such friendship~ It probably 
seemed immaterial to the sick, little interurban whether 
its big customer gained a pTesctiptive right or not. Such 
a right of way would not interefer with the meager traf-
.fic into its near empty freighthouse. It would build up 
this shipper and that in turn would result in more ser-
vice, for this traffic-starved line. Certainly there is 
~othing abortive about the deduction that this carrier 
20 
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\Ya~ content to let its neighbor and big etu;toHlPr gain a 
prescriptiYe right. This "?as the finding of the e.ourt. 
And let it not be lost sight of, that this is a law ra~e, 
and such finding is binding· on the appellate eourt. This 
rule of la "T "ill be diseussed further later on. 
IXTERRUPTIOX OF USE OF \VA Y FOR 
C(1K\~~~~IENCE OF 0\VNER OF 
DOniiNENT EST_A_TE 
Reference i~ made in the bank's brief on the botton1 
of page 23 to the fact that the use of the right of 'vay 
\Yas interrupted by the spotting of cars on the spur at 
crossings A and B. It will be noted that the railroad 
never placed a barrier on its land to prevent this flow 
of traffic, but the obstruction referred to by appellant 
\Vas placed on the land of respondent's predecessor. The 
spur was on the Cache \Talley Commission Company's 
land (plaintiff's Exhibit I, defendant's Exhibit 3). Also 
that the obstruction (the spotted cars) was placed there 
for the convenience of the Commission Company to load 
its cars and was not the assertion of a right on the part 
of the railroad that it could cut off use of the right of 
way (Tr. 220). Furthermore the interruption was for 
' but 3 or 4 days and only in some years (Tr. 219, 220). 
Rut our right is not dependent on a use every day. 
"In order to create a right by prescription, 
the user must be continuous for the statutory 
period but this requirement does not involve any 
necessity that the right be exercised constantly 
for the statutory period but rather that there be 
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no abandonment of the use or interruption thereof 
by the owner of the land.'' 1 Thompson on Real 
Property (Perm. Ed.) 724, Sec. 439. 
REFUSAL OF EVIDENCE ON 
CROSS EXAMINATION 
The court sustained our ojection to the question: 
''And so far as you know, when you used it and other 
people used it, it was with the permission of the Railroad 
Company to, facilitate their freight business.'' 
Supposing that the answer had been "yes", what 
would it have added to the case~ It wouldn't have proved 
that the use was permissive. It would merely have shown 
that so far as this witness knew, the use was permissive 
while the fact might he that the u~e was or was not 
permissive. 
On the othe-r hand, if the answer had been ''no'', 
what would have been added to the testimony in the 
case~ None of these three witnesses were submitted for 
the purpose of testifying as to the consent or the lack of 
consent of the railroad. Two of them were minor em-
ployees of the Cache Valley Commission Company, and 
the other was merely a customer. The testimony of any 
arrangements with the Railroad for permiss;ion rested 
in the hands of appellant's witness, the manager of the 
Cache Valley Commission Company, who did not testify 
to any permission sought, granted or refused. No one 
ever asked permission (Tr. 117, 136, 149, 166 and 168). 
No one ever objected to their use of the road (Tr. 136). 
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X or \Vere any barrieadPs PYPr erected ( Tr. 1:~(), 14-D, 166). · 
It ''?as used as a Ina ttPr of right ( Tr. 14~)). 
SeYeral rases are citerl \Vhere the trial eourt rP t'u~Pd 
to per1nit eross-exainination into a ~tate of n1ind or 
authority of an actor to perform the act. But that was 
not the question here. The question was not as to vvhether 
these \vitnesses, in going on the disputed right of \Vay, 
did so \v·ith adYerse intent but as to whether the wit-
nesses thought or knew his travel was \vith the permis-
sion of the railroad. It might have been materi~l if 
the question had been whether they knevv of any permis-
sion granted, but that wasn't the question. Furthermore, 
whether they did or did not have an intent to gain an 
·adverse right in going on the disputed right of way would 
have no bearing on the ease. A right of way in them is 
not claimed. The right sought here is for the owner of 
the dominent estate to have access for his customers 
whether they had friendly or hard feelings agamst the 
owner of the servient estate. The questions objected to 
\vere immaterial and called for conclu~ions and not facts. 
If the questions had been whether the witness knew 
of a permit from the railroad for such passage, there 
would be no objection. But the witness's deduction that 
the passage was with or without the railroad's permis-
sion is immaterial, ealls f~r speculation and the exclu-
Rion of it would hP- ha.rmlesR error. 
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FRIENDLY RELATIONSHIP AS E\TIDENCE OF 
US.E "UNDER'' AND NOT "AGAINST" OWNER 
On page 23 it is urged that the friendly feeling of 
cooperation between the utility on the one hand, and the 
customer on the other, took this case out of the rule be-
cause the use, as appellant urges, was permissive. But 
merely because the use was with the permission of the 
owner, it does not follow that the use of the right of 
way wa.s "under" the owner of the servient estate and 
not ''against'' him. 'For instance, in the case of Holm 
v. Davis, 41 Utah 200, 125 Pac. 403, there was a friendly 
relationship existing between the owner of the land and 
the company which operated a mill below his land. The 
former pe-rmitted the latter to build- the mill race on 
the farm in question. No written document was known 
to have granted that right. Obviously the use must have 
been with the permission of the owner. But still, was the 
use "under" or "against" the owner~ It was held to be 
"against" the owner. So the fact that it was permissive 
does not control but the question of whether the use was 
"under" or" against" the o-vvner. In this case the court, 
sitting without a jury, found the us·e to be against the 
railroad. 
JUDGMENT SHOULD BE AFFIRMED IF 
THERE IS ·SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE 
TO SUPORT IT 
This is a law case in spite of the injunctive relief 
sought. This was established in the case of Norhack v. 
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Board of DirPrtors, 8± Utah fl06, 37 P.(2) 339 at 344, 
"There the court ~aid: 
· ~ ThP pri~na r~T purpose of the instant case 
is the establislnnent of an easeinent" (for a right 
of W'ay) ~ ~ ba~Pd upon an alleged prescriptive user. 
If Plain tiff fails in this, his cause of action fails. 
The right of injunction relief cannot come into 
existence until the easement has been established. 
This issue thP Plaintiff 'vas entitled to have tried 
to a jur~T· '' 
And at page 34-5 : 
"A suit to establish an easement is legal. 
~Iason v. Ross, 77 N JE 527, 77 Atl 44. '' 
And again in Jensen v. Gerrard, 85 Utah 481, 39 P.(2) 
1070, "\vhere the suit wa~ to restrain the use of a roadway, 
the court said : 
Then, 
"This being a law case (Nor back· v. Board 
of Directors, etc. (Utah) 37 P(2) 339), this court 
is not permitted under the Constitution or the 
statutes to weigh the evidence. If there- is any 
substantial competent evidence in the record to 
support the court's findings or the verdict of the 
jury, the judgment "rill not he disturbed ·in the 
absence of some error of la"\v prejudicial to appel-
lant. Jenkins v. Stephens, 64 Utah 307,231 P 112·; 
Brown v. Union Pac. R. Co., 76 Utah 475, 290 P 
7fl9.'' 
''As this is a law action, the question is not 
whether the evidence would have supported the 
decision in favor of appellants, hut whether the 
decision made by the trial court finds support 
in the evidence. If there is competent credible 
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evidence to support the findings made by the trial 
court, then those findings should stand.'' 
In the case at bar, the court found: 
"5. That for more than 25 years preceding 
the commencement of this action, said Utah Poul-
try & Farmers ·Cooperative and its predecessors 
in interest in the land described in the next pre-
ceding paragraph have openly, notoriously, ad-
versely and continuously and without interrup-
tions and with the knowledg-e of the owner of the 
property hereinafter describeq, used the follow-
ing described servient estate as a roadway for 
providing access for foot, vehicular and animal 
traffic for themselves and for their servants, 
customers and patrons in moving to and from 
the above described dominant estate referred to 
in paragraph No. 4; said servient estate is more 
particularly described as follows: 
'Commencing at a point 177 feet North of 
the Southeast corner of Block 5, Plat "D", Logan 
City :Survey, and running thence North 16% 
feet; thence West 175 feet; thence South 16Ih 
feet; thence East 175 feet to the place of be-
ginning.' 
That said use by the defendant and its prede-
cessors in interest was not permissive.'' (Para-
graph 5, Tr. 69). 
The evidel).ce is undisputed that the respondent's 
predecessor used the right of way for more than 25 years 
without ever seeking or gaining the owne-r's permission 
(Tr. 117, 136-, 149, 150, 166, and 168). The C-ache Valley 
Commission Company used the road to the extent of 50 
to 100 vehicles a day for the entire period. It was never 
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denied the right to use the road until the property passed 
from the hands of the railroad to a purchaser who was 
a resident of Logan and must have known of the long 
continued use "·hen he bought the property for the evi-
dence showed that everyone in Logan used it (Tr. 148). 
Ko\v that he has died, the appellant bank has sought to 
terminate our use of over 25 years. 
But as pointed out above, this is a la\v case, and 
there is ample evidence to sustain the decision of the 
lower court. The judgment should therefore be affirmed. 
IRWIN CLA WSO·N 
27 
Attorney for Respo,ndent 
arnd Defendatnt 
Utah Poultry & Farm-
e~rs Cooperative 
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